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Abstract - The system of distributing financial aid dollars using 
needs analysis formulae implicitly imposes a financial aid tax on 
assets. Existing studies provide mixed evidence of the influence 
of this implicit tax on assets on wealth accumulation. This paper 
attempts to contribute to the literature on this topic by examining 
the sensitivity of results to various assumptions, specifications, 
and categories of assets, using more recent data that allows for the 
incorporation of recent developments in financial aid and college 
costs. I find much weaker evidence than existing studies that college 
financial aid has a significant impact on family savings.
INTRODUCTION
Most colleges and universities in the United States adjust the prices they charge some of their students based on 
their ability to pay. Middle and lower income families are 
often eligible for and receive financial aid from federal and 
institutional sources for their educational expenses. Needs 
analysis is the mechanism for determining eligibility for fi-
nancial aid dollars and the amount of award one will receive. 
Needs analysis formulae attempt to ascertain a family’s— 
usually both the student and his or her parents—ability to 
pay for higher education expenses. Detailed information on 
the family’s income, assets, and familial composition are 
provided by the family to the institution to which a student 
is applying for financial aid. Financial aid directors at the 
institution use this information and apply needs analysis 
formulae to the family’s financial information to determine 
how much a family should pay and thus how much financial 
aid they will receive.
The result is that families who save for their children’s 
higher education expenses are deemed more able to pay 
these expenses and therefore are charged more and receive 
less financial aid. Families who do not save as diligently will 
be expected to contribute less to the educational expenses of 
their children. As a result, the application of needs analysis 
leads to a “tax” on family assets. Among families eligible for 
financial aid, those families with higher assets are charged 
a higher price (and in some cases a higher percentage of 
their assets) to attend a college or university. This system of 
allocating financial aid resources based on needs analysis 
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and a family’s ability to pay presents a 
tax on assets and a savings disincentive 
for middle and lower–income families, 
by penalizing students and families who 
prudently save for higher education by 
reducing their financial aid awards.
Case and McPherson (1986) and more 
recently Edlin (1993) meticulously calcu-
late the theoretical financial aid tax on as-
sets faced by families who are candidates 
for financial aid. Edlin (1993) illustrates 
that while the maximum financial aid tax 
on assets in any single year is only 5.64 
percent, families who face a number of 
years of financial aid taxes may confront 
much higher cumulative tax rates on sav-
ings.1 For example, he finds that families 
who have children in college for a total of 
12 years have an effective tax on assets of 
approximately 57 percent (see Appendix 
B for a discussion of Edlin’s calculation of 
the financial aid tax on assets).2 While the 
assumed interest rate earned on savings 
may significantly lower this financial aid 
tax rate (because both income and assets 
are taxed under the financial aid rules), 
even a zero nominal interest rate on sav-
ings leads to a 44 percent financial aid 
tax on assets for a family facing 12 years 
of financial aid taxes. Even a family with 
one child enrolled for 4 years faces a 21 
percent tax on assets (again assuming zero 
nominal interest earned on those assets). 
Edlin’s (1993) focus in on estimating the 
financial aid tax rate that families may 
face under alternative scenarios. He does 
not attempt to estimate whether families’ 
savings are affected by this tax on their 
assets.
In a related study, Dick and Edlin (1997) 
empirically investigate the impact of ad-
ditional assets on a student’s financial 
aid award. They find that a typical family 
loses approximately $11,000 in financial 
aid at average–priced colleges and $15,000 
in financial aid at expensive colleges for 
each additional $50,000 in assets. They 
estimate that most families face an 8 to 26 
percent marginal tax on savings. Again, 
the focus is on the impact of the savings 
on one’s financial aid award, and not on 
whether the reduction in the award influ-
ences savings.
These sometimes rather substantial 
taxes on assets may act as a significant 
deterrent to the accumulation of assets. 
In fact, Feldstein (1995), using data from 
the 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances, 
found that financial aid taxes on assets 
have a significant adverse effect on the 
accumulation of financial wealth. His 
equation of the impact of financial aid on 
family savings was:
[1] Ai = b0 + (b1 + b2(tax)i + b3(age)i 
   + b4(# children)i)*incomei + εi ,
where A are family net financial assets, 
tax is the financial aid tax on assets, age is 
the age of the older parent, # of children are 
the number of children under the age of 18 
living at home, income is parental income, 
and ε represents the family specific error 
term for the ith family. Feldstein uses two 
stage estimation to first estimate predicted 
assets based on a quadratic in income, and 
then calculates a family’s financial aid 
tax based on their income and predicted 
assets (see Appendix B for details of Feld-
stein’s financial aid tax calculation). As a 
result, his system of equations is identified 
based on non–linearity in the relationship 
between income, assets, and the financial 
aid tax. In addition, his calculation of the 
financial aid tax ignores the important 
interaction of the financial aid tax with 
the federal and state tax rates, and with 
 1  This calculation and all subsequent calculations and discussion concern the financial aid tax on parent’s assets. 
The financial aid tax on the student’s assets is much higher, at 35 percent a year. 
 2  This financial aid tax rate assumes an 8 percent state tax rate, a marginal federal tax rate of 28 percent, and a 
financial aid tax on income of 47 percent under the Congressional Methodology in place in 1992. See Edlin 
(1993) for complete details of the calculation and assumptions.
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the assumptions surrounding the mix 
of loans versus grant aid in the financial 
aid package. Using this specification, he 
estimates that a family of four, with two 
children, income of $40,000 (in 1986 dol-
lars), and a family head aged 45, would 
have saved approximately $45,266 in the 
absence of the financial aid tax on assets. 
Because of the high financial aid tax rates 
on savings, he predicts this same family 
would only save $22,142. 
In a study that is similar in approach 
to Feldstein’s (1995) IV estimation, Kim 
(1999) finds comparable savings reduc-
tions as a result of college financial aid 
rules. Kim (1999) uses child–spacing and 
the state–specific average annual costs of 
four–year private, four–year public, and 
two–year public college to identify the 
financial aid tax separately from the asset 
equation. The strategy behind this identi-
fication approach is that two families with 
the same number of children and same 
amount of assets may face substantially 
different tax rates depending on the spac-
ing of their children. Additionally, the 
identification strategy assumes in–state 
college tuition only affects family savings 
through its impact on the financial aid 
tax on assets, and not on family savings 
directly. Using data from the 1984 through 
1992 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, Kim (1999) estimates that 
family asset accumulation is reduced by 
40 to 55 percent. These estimates suggest 
that there is a huge impact of college fi-
nancial aid rules on the savings behavior 
of financial aid eligible families. 
On the other hand, Kane (1998) points 
out that the rather high financial aid taxes 
calculated by Edlin (1993) are reduced for 
at least four reasons. First, only parental 
assets above an asset protection allow-
ance, or threshold level, are included in 
needs analysis and subject to the financial 
aid tax. Second, college financial aid taxes 
are effectively zero for extremely low– and 
extremely high–income families. Families 
whose income and assets fall below the 
income and asset protection allowances 
face zero marginal financial aid taxes. 
Similarly, families whose income and as-
sets are high enough that their expected 
family contribution (EFC) exceeds the 
cost of attendance at their institution also 
face zero financial aid taxes as they are 
ineligible for financial aid. Third, Edlin 
(1993) and Feldstein (1995) assume that 
all financial need, the gap between the 
cost of attendance and a family’s EFC, is 
met. Dick and Edlin (1997) point out that 
is often not the case as many institutions 
cannot afford to meet the full financial 
need of all of their students. Fourth, the 
effective marginal tax on savings was re-
duced with the 1992 Higher Education Re-
authorization Act, when home equity was 
excluded from the federal needs analysis 
formula. In practice, a small, but increas-
ing, number of private institutions now 
eliminate or reduce a family’s assets held 
as home equity in determining eligibility 
for institutional grant aid. Additionally, 
a significant portion of family assets is 
often held in the form of retirement assets. 
The market value of retirement assets is 
often difficult to determine, and they are 
normally excluded from the asset base in 
determining financial aid.
Using the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Survey of 1992–93, Kane 
(1998) examines the net worth of families 
with undergraduate students. If families 
were acting strategically and reducing 
their asset holdings in response to college 
financial aid rules, then one would expect 
to see a “stacking up” of family assets 
at the asset protection allowance levels. 
Kane (1998) does not find any evidence of 
family net worth clustering just below the 
asset protection allowance levels. 
In addition, the growing popularity of 
state sponsored pre–paid tuition plans 
also seem to provide prima facie evidence 
that families’ savings are not adversely 
affected by financial aid taxes. By the fall 
of 1999, 21 states had pre–paid tuition 
plans. By far the most popular state plan 
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is in Florida with over 500,000 enrollees 
and over $3.5 billion is assets (Jennings 
and Olivas, 2000, p. 18). The Higher Edu-
cation Amendments of 1992 required that 
state pre–paid tuition accounts be treated 
as “other financial assistance,” and, thus, 
carry an implicit 100 percent tax on the 
accumulated value of the plan. While 
a student whose parents have $10,000 
in financial assets may lose up to $564 
per year in financial aid (5.64 percent), a 
student with $10,000 in prepaid tuition 
loses aid dollar for dollar. This dollar for 
dollar reduction in financial aid for each 
dollar of prepaid tuition represents a 100 
percent tax on those assets. Despite this 
high tax rate, many of these state pre–paid 
tuition plans are extremely popular. While 
there is little information concerning the 
enrollees in these plans, it is probably safe 
to assume that some portion of them may 
be eligible for financial aid. 
Long (2004) estimates a system of seven 
equations incorporating uncertainty about 
the probability of attendance, college 
costs, expected family contributions, fu-
ture family income, student contributions, 
and ultimately predicted family assets, 
using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation for 1990 and 1993. Based 
on various assumptions and predicted 
values imbedded in the above estimates, 
he produces seven different measures of 
the financial aid tax. With these different 
tax rates, he estimates 14 different effects 
of financial aid on family savings and 
finds mixed results. In general, he does 
not find significant evidence that financial 
aid rules substantially reduce family sav-
ings. Additionally, his results illustrate 
the sensitivity of these types of studies 
to the underlying assumptions that are 
necessary to carry out the tests of the 
relationship between financial aid taxes 
and family savings. 
Finally, Dick et al. (2002) take a different 
approach and use realized financial aid tax 
rates based on actual financial aid awards, 
rather than estimated or expected finan-
cial aid tax rates, using the 1986–87 and 
1995–96 NPSAS data. They then use these 
actual financial aid tax rates to simulate 
the family savings and enrollment choices 
that families would have made under dif-
ferent financial aid rule scenarios. They 
estimate that families would have saved 
approximately $4,000 to $5,000 more per 
household under alternative financial aid 
regimes that do not explicitly tax family 
savings. In particular, they estimate that 
moving from a financial aid system that 
meets full need to no financial aid system 
at all would increase family savings by 29 
percent among families with college aged 
children, versus Feldstein who estimated 
an increase in savings of 50 percent under 
this scenario. Dick et al. (2002) further 
point out that their estimate understates 
the magnitude of the difference between 
their result and Feldstein’s because their 
simulation represents the reduction in 
savings for families who face the financial 
aid tax with certainty versus Feldstein’s 
(1995) estimate which includes many 
families who will not even send their 
children to college.
The evidence provided by Long (2004) 
and Kane (1998) suggests that financial 
aid taxes do not provide significant sav-
ings disincentives. On the other hand, 
the huge effects found in the studies by 
Feldstein  (1995) and Kim (1999) imply 
that families do indeed reduce their sav-
ings in anticipation of financial aid, while 
the results of Dick et al. lie in the middle 
ground with financial aid rules reducing 
family savings but by significantly less 
than estimated by Feldstein (1995) and 
Kim (1999). This study will attempt to 
contribute to the discussion by exam-
ining the savings behavior of families 
with pre–college aged children. The 
primary difference between this study 
and the existing empirical work is that 
I carefully select the sample to include 
only those families with the most con-
sistent treatment of family income and 
assets within the needs analysis formu-
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lae.3 Because family income, and not as-
sets, is a more significant determinant of 
expected family contribution, I carefully 
construct a sample of families that are as 
homogeneous as possible in their needs 
analysis treatment, particularly with re-
gards to non–custodial parental income. 
Additionally, the data set I use, the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, 
utilizes more recent data than existing 
studies. This may be important for two 
reasons. First, the 1992 Higher Education 
Reauthorization Act made two substantial 
changes to needs–analysis. One change 
was the elimination of home equity 
from the asset base in determining fi-
nancial aid in the federal needs–analysis 
methodology. This change substantially 
reduced the assets subject to the finan-
cial aid tax in determining eligibility for 
federal funds for most families, not just 
because it took home equity out of the 
base, but also because the elimination of 
home equity from the asset base dropped 
the taxable net worth of many families 
below the asset protection allowance 
and thus reduced their financial aid 
tax on assets to zero. The second change 
produced by the 1992 Reauthorization 
Act was the increase in the income thresh-
old from $15,000 to $50,000 to qualify 
for the Simplified Needs Test (SNT) in 
determining financial aid. Families with 
less than $50,000 in income, who also 
file a 1040EZ or 1040A tax form, do not 
have their assets assessed in determining 
financial aid. This change in policy also 
dropped the financial aid tax on assets 
to zero for many families. While Long 
(2004) examines 1993 data in an attempt 
to capture the influences of these changes 
on family savings, it may have been too 
short a time period to adjust assets and 
savings behavior in response to these 
changes. Later data may provide greater 
insight into whether families responded 
to these incentives. 
The second reason that more recent data 
may yield different results from earlier 
studies is the escalating costs of attend-
ing college since the mid–1980s. From 
academic year 1985 to 1997 average tu-
ition and fees at public four–year colleges 
increased by 61 percent, while average 
tuition and fees at private four–year col-
leges increased by 56 percent, in real terms 
(The College Board, 1998, p. 7). As tuition 
costs grow relative to family income more 
families become eligible for financial aid. 
Families that may not have faced a tax 
on their assets when college costs were 
lower may now face a substantial tax on 
their assets. 
Finally, although I attempt to replicate 
the IV approach of Feldstein (1995), I also 
test for and show the sensitivity of results 
to various specifications of the regression 
equation and across various forms of asset 
holdings. In a final test of the impact of 
the financial aid tax on assets I present re-
duced form estimates of the effect of child 
spacing on family net worth. As Edlin 
(1993) and Kim (1999) point out, the num-
ber of years that a family is subject to the 
financial aid tax is a greater component of 
the total financial aid tax than differences 
in income or assets, for financial aid eli-
gible families. This approach does not rely 
on any of the estimation and identification 
assumptions used in the previous stud-
ies by Feldstein (1995), Kim (1999), and 
Long (2004). Because child spacing plays 
such an important role in determining 
the costs of attendance and the financial 
aid tax on assets for families eligible for 
financial aid, this reduced form regression 
provides a test of the relationship between 
the financial aid tax on assets and family 
savings. This test does, however, rely on 
the assumption that child spacing is exog-
enous in determining family savings. This 
assumption is tested using families who 
are not eligible for financial aid based on 
their income.
3 See Appendix A for an outline of financial aid needs analysis.
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DATA
The data set used in this study is the Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 
(NLSY97). This is a national data set of 12 to 
16 year–olds in 1997. This data set provides 
a national sample of families with pre–col-
lege aged children. Both the child (or in 
some cases more than one child in a family) 
and the parents were interviewed. From the 
parent survey one can garner information 
on family income and asset levels, and age 
of the parents. From the household screen-
ers one can identify household composition 
and child spacing. 
Because the NLSY97 was designed to 
survey youths aged 12 to 16, and does 
not necessarily provide a representative 
sample of families, it is important to com-
pare the income and asset variables from 
the NLSY97 to nationally representative 
data. Table 1 provides summary measures 
of the households from the NLSY97 to 
families from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances of 1995 (SCF95). While the 
NLSY97 is taken two years later than the 
SCF95, this benchmarking suggests that 
the households from the NLSY97 appear 
to be comparable in terms of income and 
assets to the SCF95.
I next attempt to pare the data set down 
to those families that are likely to be eli-
gible for financial aid from at least some of 
the colleges and universities in the United 
States, and for whom the financial aid 
rules are most clear cut. Table 2 outlines 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF NLSY97 TO SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES, 1995 
(all values are in thousands of nominal dollars)
a1996 income
b1994 income
NLSY97 SCF95
Before–tax family income
 age of head 35–44
 age of head 45–54
Family net worth
 age of head 35–44
 age of head 45-54
Financial assets as a percentage of total assets
 55.2a
 69.0a
146.4
278.9
 35.6%
 48.3b
 64.8b
144.5
277.8
 34.1%
TABLE 2 
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH, 1997 COHORT SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
9,022
6,840
3,541
1,051
35
285
752
285
134
757
All individuals
Number of separate households identified
 Less:
  Not living with 2 biological parents
  Household members (other than parents) who are older than 18
  Household members under age 18 who are not full siblings
  Self–employed and/or farmers
  Older parent is younger than 40 or older than 50
  Income less than zero or greater than $150,000
  Non–reported household net worth (created variable) or net financial assets greater  
   than $500,000
Selected households
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the exclusions made to the sample. For 
example, from the 6,840 separate house-
holds identified in the NLSY97, 3,541 are 
excluded because one of the children was 
not living with both of his/her biological 
parents. This may be important as the 
treatment, in determining financial aid 
awards, of non–custodial parent’s income 
and assets varies tremendously across 
institutions. Additionally, another 1,051 
families are eliminated from the sample 
because there is a sibling or household 
member over the age of 18 (other than 
the parents). This excludes families with 
college–aged children and/or other 
adults who may either lay claim to the 
educational resources of the family or 
be able to provide additional resources. 
An additional 35 families are excluded 
because of the presence of a half–sibling 
in the household, for reasons cited above. 
The remaining families consist of full–sib-
lings living with their two biological 
parents. From this set of homogeneously 
constructed families, families whose head 
is self–employed and/or a farmer are ex-
cluded because their asset accumulation 
behavior may be dramatically different 
from non–self–employed heads of house-
holds. Similarly, only families whose older 
parent is between the ages of 40 and 50 
are included in the sample, in order to 
avoid problems of properly specifying the 
relationship between assets and the age of 
the older parent. This is also the approach 
followed by Feldstein (1995), and will thus 
allow for easier comparison of results.4 
Families who report income less than 
zero or greater than $150,000 are excluded 
from the sample. Similarly, families who 
did not report household net worth, or 
who reported net financial assets greater 
than $500,000 are also excluded from the 
sample. The income threshold is used in 
order to include those families who may 
be eligible for financial aid, based on 
income, from at least some of the most 
expensive institutions in the country. This 
threshold will be eliminated in one specifi-
cation to check the sensitivity of the results 
to this income cut–off. The asset threshold 
is used cautiously as one is hesitant to 
select based upon the endogenous vari-
able in an equation, but the excessively 
high level of financial assets relative to 
income and the clear ineligibility of these 
families for financial aid warrants their 
elimination. The remaining sample, used 
in this study, contains 757 families. Table 
3 contains summary measures for selected 
variables from the final sample.
Following the calculations of Edlin 
(1993), the expected financial aid tax on as-
sets is calculated as the ratio of the return 
on assets assuming no financial aid tax on 
assets to the return on assets incorporating 
the financial aid tax on assets.5 This cal-
culation incorporates all of the marginal 
taxes on savings, including the marginal 
federal income tax rate, the state tax rate, 
and the financial aid tax on assets.6 Ad-
ditionally, some assumptions concerning 
a family’s estimated higher education 
expenses are necessary. In estimating the 
financial aid tax on assets, I follow the 
Feldstein (1995) approach and assume 
that for families with expected estimated 
family contributions (EFC) exceeding 
$19,360 per concurrently enrolled child 
(the average private, four–year tuition, 
fees, room, and board for the 1997–98 
academic year) or less than zero, the ex-
pected financial aid tax rate is zero. If your 
EFC, divided by the number of children 
 4  The following results are sensitive with respect to restrictions on the parent’s age. This is likely due to difficulty 
in estimating the relationship between income and assets for different age groups. The limitations imposed 
here minimize this problem.
 5  See Appendix B for calculations of the financial aid tax on assets.
 6  The state income tax rate used is the average used by the Federal Methodology (FM) in calculating a family’s 
available income. The assumed estimated state tax rate is 4 percent for family income less than or equal to 
$15,000, and 3 percent for family income greater than $15,000 as used in the FM.
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concurrently enrolled, is less than zero 
or above the average cost of attendance, 
then the accumulation of additional assets 
does not affect your financial aid award, 
and therefore has a financial aid tax of 
zero. In estimating the financial aid tax for 
this paper, the financial aid tax also goes 
to zero if the individual qualifies for the 
Simplified Needs Test with family income 
less than $50,000. It is also assumed that 
all of a student’s need (the difference be-
tween the full sticker–price of attendance 
minus the EFC) is met with financial aid, 
and some portion of financial aid comes 
in the form of loans. As an individual’s 
eligibility for a Pell Grant declines dollar 
for dollar with an increase in EFC, up to 
the maximum of the Pell award ($2,700 in 
1997), the impact of additional assets on 
financial aid varies across EFC levels. For 
this analysis I assume that an increase in 
EFC up to $2,700 reduces grant aid from 
the Pell program. For EFC greater than 
$2,700, I assume that the financial aid 
award is reduced in equal proportions of 
loans and grants, and that loans account 
for one–third of financial aid above the 
Pell award, and that student loans carry 
a 50 percent subsidy value due to their 
favorable terms.7 
The Feldstein (1995) financial aid tax 
calculation varies from the financial aid 
tax used in this paper for a number of 
reasons. First, Feldstein’s (1995) tax rate 
does not account for the $50,000 income 
threshold for the Simplified Needs Test, 
as this was not in place in 1986 when he 
estimated the impact of the tax on assets. 
Second, his analysis does not account for 
the interaction of federal and state taxes on 
the financial aid tax. Third, his calculation 
assumes that all financial aid is in the form 
Maximum
TABLE 3 
SELECTED VARIABLE SUMMARY MEASURES
Mean Minimum
Financial Aid Tax
Feldstein Financial Aid Tax
Parental Income
Net Financial Assets
Financial Assets
Taxable Assets
Net Worth
Number of Children
Age of Older Parent
No. of Financial Aid Tax Years
Family Contribution
Available Income
Adjusted Available Income
No. of Observations
17.9%
28.8%
 $56,526
 $41,489
 $45,039
 $73,935
$154,146
2.2
43.9
6.9
 $10,064
 $22,985
 $27,235
757
0.0%
0.0%
$0
 –$71,700
$0
–$119,500
 –$72,500
1
40
0
   –$750
 –$29,965
 –$29,965
68.1%
86.0%
  $139,500
  $460,500
  $460,500
$1,242,500
$2,145,137
8
50
20
   $43,747
   $78,513
  $102,297
Note: The financial aid tax, family contribution, available income, and adjusted available income were all cal-
culated using net financial assets.
 7   Feldstein (1995) also assumes that all of a student’s need is met with financial aid. He makes the additional 
implicit assumption that the financial aid is entirely grant aid and contains no loans.
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of grants and not loans. Fourth, Feldstein 
(1995) assumed that children were spaced 
two years apart in age, where the actual 
spacing in this data is closer to three years 
apart. The end result is that the financial 
aid tax calculation used in this paper is 
lower than the Feldstein (1995) replicated 
tax rate applied to this data set.
Using the 1998–1999 federal methodol-
ogy (FM) for determining the EFC and a 
family’s expected eligibility for federally 
sponsored financial aid, I examine the 
impact of the expected financial aid tax 
on family savings.8 Because the marginal 
financial aid tax rate on assets is a function 
of assets, two–stage regression estimation 
is used. In the first stage, actual family 
assets are regressed against income and 
income–squared. The coefficients from 
this regression are used to estimate fam-
ily assets. This fitted value is then used 
in the formula to determine the marginal 
financial aid tax. Similar to Kim (1999), 
I use actual chronological spacing of 
children to further identify the expected 
financial aid tax on assets. Child spacing 
is assumed to be exogenous to the asset 
accumulation equation and to influence 
family savings only through its impact 
on the financial aid tax. This assumption 
is tested later in the reduced form regres-
sions of assets against child spacing for 
those not eligible for financial aid. In the 
second–stage, family assets are regressed 
against family income, number of children 
in the family, the age of the older parent, 
and the financial aid tax rate on assets.
The effect of the financial tax on fam-
ily savings is tested using four different 
measures of family wealth: 1) financial 
assets, which includes cash, stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds, and other financial 
instruments; 2) net financial assets, which 
includes all of financial assets above less 
any financial debt (excluding mortgage 
debt); 3) taxable assets, which include all 
of number 1 above, financial assets, plus 
home equity, less any retirement assets 
(this is the asset base that is used by most 
private college and universities); and 4) 
net worth, which includes all assets of the 
family less any debt. 
RESULTS
Table 4 presents the results of the sec-
ond–stage regression estimation of the as-
set accumulation equation. For compara-
bility, I specify the first– and second–stage 
regression equations in Table 4 to match 
the specification with the strongest re-
sults in the Feldstein (1995) paper. In this 
table, assets are defined as net financial 
assets. Specification (1) presents the asset 
accumulation equation and financial aid 
tax that most closely matches Feldstein’s 
(1995) results. The accumulated assets 
are an increasing function of income, age, 
and number of children, and a decreasing 
function of the financial aid tax on as-
sets. For example, for a family with a 44 
year–old older parent, two children, and a 
financial aid tax on assets of 28.8 percent, 
a dollar increase in income results in a 
1.23 dollar increase in net financial assets. 
Additionally, evaluating the savings disin-
centives of the financial aid tax for a family 
with income of $56,500 (approximately the 
mean in the sample) and the above charac-
teristics results in a statistically significant 
reduction in financial assets of $6,118. In 
the absence of a financial aid tax the above 
family would be predicted to accumulate 
$50,310 in net financial assets, while ac-
cumulating only $44,192 as a result of the 
financial aid tax on assets.
Specification (2) of Table 4 re–calculates 
the financial aid tax adjusting for actual 
 8   The Federal Methodology (FM) and the Institutional Methodology (IM), used by many private institutions 
to calculate the financial aid tax on assets, are quite comparable. The primary difference between the two 
methodologies is the exclusion of home equity from the asset base in the FM, and its inclusion in the asset 
base in the IM. 
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child spacing versus the assumed two 
year child spacing used above and results 
in a slight reduction on the coefficient of 
the financial aid tax on savings interacted 
with income from –0.376 to –0.293. This 
translates to a decrease in assets of $4,768 
for those with the average characteristics 
outlined above.
In order to test the robustness of 
Feldstein’s (1995) approach to estimating 
the impact of the financial aid tax on net 
financial assets, I specify the equation 
as a simple linear relationship between 
net financial assets and income, number 
of children, age of the older parent, and 
the financial aid tax (specification (3) in 
Table 4). Once again the coefficient on 
the financial aid tax is negative and sig-
nificant, indicating that families who face 
a higher financial aid tax save less. The 
estimated impact is that families who face 
the average financial aid tax, as calculated 
by Feldstein (1995), but using actual child 
spacing, save $6,262 less than they other-
wise would in the absence of this tax. 
In a final check of the sensitivity of the 
results to the specification of the equation, 
in specification (4) of Table 4 I include in 
the sample higher income families (I no 
longer cap family income at $150,000), 
and no longer cap tuition at the average 
for private four–year colleges. Essentially 
I allow the financial aid tax rate to climb 
all the way up the income distribution 
without reverting back to zero. As these 
families in fact are not likely to face a 
financial aid tax on their assets because 
their calculated EFC per concurrently 
enrolled child exceeds the expected cost 
of attendance, one would expect the im-
pact of the tax on family assets to decline 
using this specification. In fact, the effect 
of the financial aid tax on assets increases 
using this approach. This finding sug-
(1)      (2)     (3)       (4)
TABLE 4 
REPLICATION OF FELDSTEIN’S FINANCIAL AID RESULTS
Dependent Variable = Net Financial Assets
Intercept
Income
Income*Number of Children
Income*Age of Older Parent
Income*Financial Aid Tax
Number of Children
Age of Older Parent
Financial Aid Tax
–25,230.36***
(5,947.39)
–1.365**
(0.660)
0.097*
(0.051)
0.057***
(0.014)
–0.376**
(0.185)
–25,636.90***
(5,965.94)
–1.358**
(0.662)
0.094*
(0.051)
0.055***
(0.014)
–0.293*
(0.168)
–15,9689.56***
(40,999.52)
1.277***
(0.094)
4,361.46
(2,782.70)
2,876.08***
(886.11)
–21,744.26*
(11,268.64)
–1,728.77
(7,478.06)
–2.122***
(0.702)
–0.078
(0.080)
0.055***
(0.013)
1.482**
(0.704)
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
Specification (1): replication of Feldstein (1995) using NLSY97 data.
Specification (2): Feldstein (1995) specification with actual child spacing used in calculating the financial aid 
tax.
Specification (3): actual child spacing and linear specification.
Specification (4): includes high income (>$150,000) families and eliminates EFC families cap in calculating the 
financial aid tax rate.
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gests that the result is being determined, 
at least in part, by the specification of the 
relationship between assets, income, and 
the financial aid tax, and the assumptions 
governing the estimation of the expected 
financial aid tax.
In summary, the estimation approach 
and financial aid tax calculation followed 
by Feldstein (1995), and matched closely 
by Kim (1999), applied to the more recent 
prospective college students in this data 
set leads to results that are qualitatively 
similar. Families appear to save less in 
terms of net financial assets in response 
to a higher financial aid tax on assets; 
however, the magnitudes of the effects are 
generally smaller. While Feldstein (1995) 
and Kim (1999) find effects that suggest a 
40 to 60 percent reduction in savings for 
the average financial aid recipient, I find 
effects that suggest approximately a 15 
percent reduction in savings.9 The results 
found here, while not directly comparable 
with Dick et al. (2002), are more in line 
with the order of magnitude found in 
their study.
As a further test of Feldstein’s (1995) ap-
proach on more recent cohorts of families 
I estimate the impact of his financial aid 
tax, using actual child spacing in each 
case, on varying categories of assets. Net 
financial assets may not be the appropriate 
measure of assets in this type of analysis, 
as financial debt is not included in needs 
analysis in determining the asset base; 
therefore, the first asset base investigated 
in Table 5 is financial assets (rather than 
financial assets net of financial debt). 
Financial assets are simply net financial 
assets as defined above after adding back 
financial debt. This equation is estimated 
using a Tobit regression, as financial assets 
are censored at zero. The results change 
dramatically. The coefficient on the fi-
nancial aid tax interacted with income 
is now a positive .331 and significant at 
the 10 percent level. This suggests that 
families who face a higher financial aid 
tax actually have greater financial assets 
than those who face a lower financial aid 
tax. This result, coupled with the finding 
that net financial assets are lower for high 
tax families suggest either that families 
who face a higher financial aid tax have 
higher financial assets and even higher 
financial debt, or that the results are quite 
sensitive to the measurement of assets, 
or both.
Net Worth
TABLE 5 
REPLICATION OF FELDSTEIN’S FINANCIAL AID RESULTS VITH VARYING ASSET BASE
Financial Assets Taxable Assets
Intercept
Income
Income*Number of Children
Income*Age of Older Parent
Income*Financial Aid Tax
–103,000.26***
(6,228.81)
–0.974
(0.672)
0.027
(0.052)
0.065***
(0.014)
0.331*
(0.171)
–14,165.72*
(7,995.59)
0.168
(0.863)
0.065
(0.067)
0.029
(0.018)
–0.029
(0.220)
–41,474.09*
(22,351.15)
–0.102
(2.41)
–0.052
(0.188)
0.085*
(0.051)
–0.262
(0.614)
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
All three specifications use Feldstein’s (1995) specification with actual child spacing across varying asset bases.
 9 It is interesting to note that Long (2002) in an attempt to replicate Feldstein’s (1995) results with the 1986 
Survey of Consumer Finances data estimated a coefficient of –.36, and was unable to replicate the –1.4 coef-
ficient found by Feldstein (1995). Long attributes this discrepancy to the tremendous sensitivity of the results 
to sample construction, the financial aid tax calculation, and specification.
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Neither financial assets nor net financial 
assets may be accurately measuring the 
asset base that is most applicable in needs 
analysis. The “taxable assets” captured by 
needs analysis includes cash and other 
financial assets, and home equity, but 
excludes retirement assets and debt. I 
include home equity among the taxable 
assets even though it is excluded from 
the asset base in the federal needs analy-
sis methodology because it is included 
among the asset base when applying for 
financial aid at most private institutions. 
One should consider taxable assets in this 
analysis as the upper bound asset base 
taxed in financial aid, and financial assets 
as the lower bound. When taxable assets 
are used as the dependent variable, the co-
efficient on the financial aid tax interacted 
with income is negative but negligible in 
magnitude and not significantly different 
from zero. The financial aid tax does not 
appear to have a significant impact on 
taxable assets. 
Finally, if the exercise is truly to exam-
ine the impact of the financial aid rules 
on family asset accumulation, then the 
appropriate measure of savings should 
be net worth. In specification (3) of Table 
5, the dependent variable is net worth. 
In this specification, the coefficient on 
the financial aid tax interacted with in-
come is once again negative and similar 
in magnitude to the results of Table 4, 
where the dependent variable was net 
financial assets. This result translates into 
a $4,263 reduction in assets for a family 
with $56,500 in income and facing a 28.8 
percent financial aid tax. This reduction 
in savings represents an average decrease 
in net worth of approximately 2.8 percent, 
although this effect is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Edlin (1993) outlined a calculation of 
the financial aid tax on assets that incor-
porated the interaction of the financial aid 
tax with state and federal taxes and al-
lowed for consideration of subsidized 
loans as a component of financial aid. 
These changes in the estimation of the 
expected financial aid tax on assets results 
in a reduction in the estimated tax on 
assets. Specifically, the Feldstein (1995) 
calculation of the financial aid tax applied 
to these data has a mean tax rate of 28.8 
percent, while the Edlin (1993) calculation 
of the financial aid tax applied to these 
data has a mean value of 17.9 percent 
(see Appendix B for details of these cal-
culations).
Table 6 examines the impact of the Edlin 
(1993) calculated financial tax on net finan-
cial assets under various specifications in 
order to test the sensitivity of the previous 
results to the calculation of the financial 
aid tax and to specification of the equation. 
Specification (1) of Table 6 replicates speci-
fication (1) of Table 4, and is essentially 
a test of the sensitivity of the results to 
changes in the assumptions surrounding 
the calculation of the expected financial 
aid tax. The coefficients on the other re-
gressors remain largely unchanged from 
the previous specification. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on the financial aid 
tax interacted with income decreases 
dramatically from –.376 to –0.096, and 
is no longer significantly different from 
zero, at conventional levels. Specifica-
tion (2) of Table 6 allows the regressors 
to enter the regression linearly, rather 
than interacted with income. This speci-
fication is a replication of specification 
(3) of Table 4, but using the Edlin (1993) 
financial aid tax calculation. Once again 
the coefficient on the financial aid tax is 
negative, but it is no longer significantly 
different from zero. Using the Feldstein 
(1995) financial aid tax the coefficient on 
this tax was –21,744, while under the Edlin 
(1993) calculation the coefficient dropped 
to –4,653. As an additional test of this 
result I include among the regressors the 
responding parent’s race and the highest 
degree attained by either of the parents. 
While the coefficient on the financial aid 
tax increases, it still is not significantly 
different from zero.
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One of the underlying assumptions of 
the previous analyses is that every family 
expects their children to attend college. 
Of course, this assumption may grossly 
overstate the actual expected enrollment 
probabilities of families. Fortunately, 
the NLSY97 asked both the student and 
the responding parent to estimate the 
“percent chance” that the child will have 
a four–year college degree by age 30.10 
Parents and students who responded that 
the child had a 50 percent or more chance 
of obtaining a four–year college degree by 
age 30 (39 percent of the chosen sample) 
(1)   (2)       (3)        (4)
Dependent Variable = Net Financial Assets
TABLE 6 
REGRESSION RESULTS USING EDLIN FINANCIAL AID TAX
Intercept
Income
Income*Number of Children
Income*Age of Older Parent
Income*Financial Aid Tax
Number of Children
Age of Older Parent
Financial Aid Tax
Financial Aid Tax*Likely to Attend College
Black
Asian
Other Race
Parents’ Highest Degree:
Associates Degree
College Degree
Graduate Degree
–27,978.32***
(5,932.27)
–1.380**
(0.677)
0.079
(0.054)
0.056***
(0.014)
–0.096
(0.226)
–165,822.97***
(41,733.12)
1.251***
(0.100)
3,739.13
(2,878.08)
2,942.98***
(903.70)
–4,653.57
(13,912.16)
–143,483.38***
(41,694.30)
1.100***
(0.109)
2,858.54
(2,877.03)
2,653.16***
(900.58)
–6,475.49
(13,937.20)
–15,386.77*
(7,993.32)
8,084.94
(21,217.20)
–11,391.33
(9,001.32)
–14,040.41*
(8,378.47)
14,663.12**
(6,815.13)
18,128.08**
(8,936.87)
–42,031.56
(39,213.30)
1.083***
(0.100)
375.53
(2,619.23)
538.19
(853.37)
–38,215.51
(28,300.40)
30,657.99
(28,840.20)
–20,209.61*
(7,424.47)
2,633.22
(17,101.80)
–14,150.54
(8,757.48)
–14,846.57*
(8,086.67)
17,790.38***
(6,629.48)
15,058.48*
(8,630.67)
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
10  Recall that the NLSY97 is a survey of youth aged 12–16, from which I am using the parent survey. Parents were 
asked to estimate the probability that the surveyed child will attend college. I assume in this specification that 
all of the children in the family have the same probability of attendance.
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were defined as being “likely to attend 
college.” This dichotomous probability 
variable was interacted with the financial 
aid tax (specification (4), Table 6). One 
would expect that if there were a savings 
disincentive effect of financial aid that 
it should be larger for those who have a 
higher expected probability of attendance. 
In fact, the coefficient on the interaction 
of the financial aid tax and the likely–to– 
obtain–a–college–degree dummy variable 
is positive, suggesting that those families 
where the expectations of attendance are 
highest are more likely to save in response 
to higher financial aid taxes than those 
who do not think their children are likely 
to attend college, although this effect is not 
significant. Similar results emerge when 
the likelihood of obtaining a four–year de-
gree, as expressed by both the student and 
the parent, is increased to 75 percent, and 
again when it is increased to 90 percent.
These results suggest that estimates 
of the impact of the financial aid tax on 
accumulated assets are sensitive to the 
calculation of this tax and the assumptions 
underlying that calculation. 
In Table 7, I turn to testing for the 
robustness of these results to changes in 
the measurement of the asset base. Earlier 
studies on the impact of financial aid rules 
on assets had an easier time determining 
the appropriate asset base and financial aid 
tax as the federal government and private 
institutions usually used the same asset 
base and needs analysis methodology, as 
outlined above. In 1992, the federal gov-
ernment adopted the Federal Methodol-
ogy (FM) of allocating federally funded 
financial aid dollars, which deviates from 
the Institutional Methodology (IM) that 
most private institutions use to determine 
eligibility for institutional financial aid 
dollars. The financial aid tax calculation 
is quite similar under both the FM and 
the standard IM, but the asset base varies 
across these methodologies. In particular, 
the FM excludes home equity from the 
asset base, while the standard IM includes 
home equity. Further complicating the 
appropriate calculation of financial aid 
taxes and their impact is the trend toward 
institution–specific application of needs 
analysis, in which individual colleges ei-
ther slightly or significantly alter the needs 
analysis formula in an attempt to achieve 
institutional objectives. Table 7 examines 
the impact of the financial aid tax on “tax-
able assets.” Taxable assets, in this paper, 
are defined as cash, checking, stocks, bond, 
mutual funds, other financial assets, and 
home equity. Taxable assets do not include 
financial debt or retirement assets. 
Specification (1) of Table 7 is a regression 
of taxable assets against income and income 
interacted with number of children, age of 
the older parent, and the financial aid tax. 
The coefficient on income interacted with 
the financial aid tax is positive, but not sig-
nificantly different from zero. Specification 
(2) of Table 7 allows the regressors to enter 
the equation linearly. Again the estimated 
impact of the financial aid tax on assets 
is positive, but not significantly different 
from zero. Additionally, adding controls 
for the parent’s race and educational at-
tainment does not qualitatively alter this 
conclusion. The impact of the financial 
aid tax on assets remains insignificantly 
different from zero. Finally, incorporating 
the interaction of the likelihood of attend-
ing with the financial aid tax, I once again 
find that those who are more likely to send 
their children to college actually save more 
in response to a higher financial aid tax, 
although the effect is not significant. These 
results suggest that the tax on assets from 
college financial aid does not appear to 
have a significant impact on family savings 
as measured by taxable assets.
As a final reduced form estimate of 
the impact of financial aid on family 
savings, I regress various categories of 
assets against the number of years that 
a family will have children enrolled in 
college (financial aid tax years). The un-
derlying assumption here is that if there 
is an impact of financial aid on savings, 
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then families who face a longer window 
of financial aid, because their children 
are further apart in age, will have lower 
accumulated assets. This assumption is 
only valid if child spacing does not affect 
savings directly, and only influences sav-
ings through its impact on the financial 
aid tax. To test this assumption I create 
a dummy variable for “middle–income” 
($50,000 to $100,000; recall that for families 
with income less than $50,000 the tax on 
assets is zero using the Simplified Needs 
Test). The middle–income indicator vari-
able is interacted with the financial aid 
tax years variable. The results, in Table 8, 
indicate that child spacing, in terms of the 
number of financial aid tax years to which 
a family is subjected, does not appear to 
have a significant effect on net financial 
assets, for those families who are not likely 
to have their assets taxed by financial aid, 
either because their income is too low (less 
than $50,000) or too high (greater than 
$100,000). Similarly, even for families for 
(1)   (2)       (3)        (4)
Dependent Variable = Taxable Assets
TABLE 7 
REGRESSION RESULTS USING EDLIN FINANCIAL AID TAX
Intercept
Income
Income*Number of Children
Income*Age of Older Parent
Income*Financial Aid Tax
Number of Children
Age of Older Parent
Financial Aid Tax
Financial Aid Tax*Likely to Attend College
Black
Asian
Other Race
Parents’ Highest Degree:
Associates Degree
College Degree
Graduate Degree
Note: *** (**,*) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
–14,612.93**
(7,562.73)
0.163
(0.863)
0.055
(0.069)
0.029
(0.018)
0.082
(0.288)
–113,121.66**
(52,994.90)
1.553***
(0.127)
3,848.64
(3,653.39)
2,038.06**
(1,147.58)
7,504.03
(17,632.62)
–87,242.71*
(52,826.00)
1.396***
(0.138)
2,922.75
(3,643.79)
1,767.35*
(1,141.03)
2,115.48
(17,628.70)
–29,351.06***
(10,127.60)
3,096.30
(26,882.00)
–14,430.89
(11,405.20)
–23,329**
(10,614.90)
19,078.78**
(8,634.30)
10,247.19
(11,323.70)
–19,314.68
(59,356.40)
1.614***
(0.151)
299.57
(3,962.63)
289.89
(1,291.73)
–5,310.03
(42,710.90)
23,068.05
(43,530.50)
–36,913.49***
(11,236.20)
–20,165.64
(25,886.60)
–21,186.90
(13,256.70)
–40,282.47***
(12,239.20)
17,904.13*
(10,034.80)
–11,983.94
(13,064.90)
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which child spacing is likely to have the 
largest effect in terms of their financial aid 
tax on assets there does not appear to be 
a significant impact of child spacing on 
net financial assets. Similar results were 
found for the impact of the number of fi-
nancial aid tax years on taxable assets and 
family net worth. For families that are not 
likely to have their assets taxed under the 
financial aid system, child spacing and, 
thus, the number of tax years does not ap-
pear to have a significant impact on asset 
accumulation. For those middle–income 
families for which the number of financial 
aid tax years is likely to have a substantial 
impact on their financial aid tax, there is 
no significant difference in the impact of 
child spacing on family assets.11
Because some assets are considered in 
calculating financial aid while others are 
excluded from the asset base, as outlined 
above, there may be an incentive for fami-
lies to reallocate their wealth toward those 
assets that are exempt from the asset base 
in determining a family’s financial aid. To 
investigate this possibility I calculated the 
ratio of assets that are at least sometimes 
excluded from the asset base (home equity 
and retirement assets) to total assets (net 
worth). This percentage of assets that are 
protected from financial aid consideration 
was regressed on income, number of chil-
Net Worth
Intercept
Income
Number of Children
Age of Older Parent
Financial Aid Tax Years
No. Tax Years*Middle Income
Black
Asian
Other Race
Parents’ Highest Degree:
Associates Degree
College Degree
Graduate Degree
–149,716.04***
(42,517.49)
1.095***
(0.113)
–1,467.39
(5,663.30)
2,709.09***
(906.33)
1,795.11
(2,109.61)
–194.32
(766.01)
–15,465.09*
(8,048.24)
8,394.84
(21,301.52)
–11,080.37
(9,035.49)
–13,646.03
(8,430.29)
14,569.73**
(6,844.41)
18,008.33**
(8,963.07)
–93,540.81
(53,910.49)
1.387***
(0.144)
–1,646.15
(7,180.84)
1,827.10
(1,149.19)
1,892.04
(2,674.90)
220.73
(971.27)
–29,390.13***
(10,204.84)
3,385.83
(27,009.47)
–14,159.16
(11,456.64)
–22,872.78**
(10,689.27)
18,983.04**
(8,678.43)
9,882.11
(11,364.82)
–26,4050.85*
(15,2315.48)
3.67***
(0.406)
3,467.6
(20,288.33)
5,183.12
(3,246.86)
699.83
(7,557.51)
–1,657.86
(2,744.17)
–58,908.75**
(28,832.16)
–13,871.76
(76,310.96)
–15,791.05
(32,368.92)
–70,937.32**
(30,200.83)
4,659.35
(24,519.53)
–46,769.76
(32,109.49)
TABLE 8 
REDUCED FORM REGRESSION OF THE IMPACT OF THE NUMBER OF TAX YEARS ON ASSETS
Net Financial Assets Taxable Assets
Note:  *** (**,*) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent (5, 10) level.
11  Similar results were found when middle–income was defined to be from $50,00 to $90,000, $50,000 to $110,000, 
$50,000 to $120,000, and even $50,000 to $130,000.
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dren, age of the older parent, and the fi-
nancial aid tax (results are not shown). The 
financial aid tax did not appear to have a 
significant impact on the percentage of a 
family’s wealth (nor on the log odds ratio) 
that was allocated to the assets that are 
sometimes excluded from the asset base 
in determining financial aid. 
CONCLUSION
The system of distributing financial aid 
dollars based on expected family contribu-
tions as calculated using needs analysis 
formulae implicitly imposes a financial 
aid tax on assets. As illustrated in Case 
and McPherson (1986) and Edlin (1993), 
these tax rates can reach quite significant 
levels if a family has a number of children 
and these children are spaced apart in age. 
Feldstein (1995) and Kim (1999), and to a 
lesser degree Dick et al. (2002), find that 
these financial aid taxes create a significant 
savings disincentive, such that families fac-
ing higher financial aid taxes accumulate 
less in financial assets than comparable 
families facing lower financial aid taxes. 
Kane (1998) and Long (2004), however, do 
not find convincing evidence that college 
financial aid influences family savings. 
This paper uses a more recent data set 
from 1997 and examines the sensitivity of 
the impact of financial aid on family sav-
ings to the construction of the financial aid 
tax, the specification of the relationship 
between assets and familial characteris-
tics, and the measurement of family sav-
ings. When replicating Feldstein’s (1995) 
results, with the more recent data, I too 
find that a higher financial aid tax reduces 
net financial assets; however, the impact I 
find is substantially smaller than the effect 
estimated by Feldstein (1995) and Kim 
(1999) and more in line with the estimates 
of Dick et al. (2002). Additionally, I find 
that the results are sensitive to alternative 
estimates of a family’s financial aid tax, and 
various measures of family wealth. In fact, 
when using other specifications and more 
plausibly exogenous sources of variation in 
the marginal tax rates across families, I do 
not find a significant relationship between 
the financial aid tax and family savings. At 
the very least, this study, like Long (2004), 
points out the sensitivity of estimates of 
the impact of financial aid rules on asset 
accumulation to the litany of assumptions 
that is necessary to calculate the expected 
financial aid tax on assets, and to measure-
ment of the appropriate asset base. 
If in fact families are not responsive to 
the tax on assets imbedded in the financial 
aid system, it may because they are not 
familiar with the arcane calculations that 
underlie needs analysis. It may also be 
because these arcane calculations tend to 
change over time. As outlined above, needs 
analysis formulae underwent a significant 
change with the Higher Education Reau-
thorization Act of 1992. The Institutional 
Methodology of needs analysis changed 
dramatically again in 2001. The primary 
changes involved the calculation of the 
Income Protection Allowance, the Asset 
Protection Allowance, and the treatment of 
concurrently enrolled students in college. 
Under the new IM it is no longer the case 
that the family’s contribution per child 
was simply the total EFC divided by the 
number enrolled in college. Now a family 
with two children enrolled is expected to 
pay 60 percent of their calculated EFC per 
child. In short, while child spacing is still 
a significant factor in determining how 
much a family ultimately pays for col-
lege, its effect has been reduced. Whether 
families have been influenced or not by the 
more recent developments in financial aid 
remains an open question.
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APPENDIX A—NEEDS–ANALYSIS
The following provides a brief description of 
the basic framework for assessing the Expected 
Family Contribution (EFC) from the parents of 
a dependent student.
C O N T R I B U T I O N  F R O M  PA R E N T S ’ 
INCOME:
Total Income – actual federal income taxes paid 
– estimated state income taxes paid – estimated 
social security taxes – an Employment Expense 
Allowance – an Income Protection Allowance = 
Parents’ Available Income (AI).
Income Protection Allowance varies by fam-
ily size and the number of students enrolled 
in college.
 Employment Expense Allowance equals 35 
percent of the lesser earned income for married 
parents, to a maximum of $2,800.
CONTRIBUTION FROM PARENTS’ ASSETS:
Financial Assets (including cash, checking, stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds) – pension and retirement 
assets + an adjusted assessment value for a family 
business or farm – an Asset Protection Allowance 
= Parents’ Taxable Assets.*
Asset Protection Allowance varies by the age of 
the older parent and by marital status.
Parents’ Adjusted Available Income (AAI) = 
Parents’ Available Income + .12 × Parents’ Tax-
able Assets.
PARENTS’ CONTRIBUTION FROM AAI:
AAI     
Less than –$3,409  
–$3,409 to $10,800  
$10,801 to $13,500  
$13,501 to $16,200  
$16,201 to $19,000  
$19,001 to $21,700  
$21,701 or more
Parents’ Contribution
–$750  
22% of AAI  
$2,376 + 25% of AAI over $10,800 
$3,051 + 29% of AAI over $13,500 
$3,834 + 34% of AAI over $16,200 
$4,786 + 40% of AAI over $19,000 
$5,866 + 47% of AAI over $21,700  
  
Financial Aid Award = Cost of Attendance – Parent 
Contribution (assuming that all need is fully met 
and that the student contribution is zero)
*The data in this paper excludes self–employed 
parents and so no adjustments were necessary 
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for family businesses or farms. Additionally, the 
calculation of Taxable Assets is different for the 
Federal Methodology (FM), used to determine 
eligibility for federal funds, versus the Institu-
tional Methodology (IM) of needs–analysis, used 
to allocate institutional funds at most private 
institutions, following the 1992 Higher Educa-
tion Reauthorization Act. In particular, the FM 
excludes home equity from taxable assets, while 
the standard IM used by most private institutions 
includes home equity. This paper includes home 
equity in the assets labeled “taxable assets.”
APPENDIX B—CALCULATING THE 
FINANCIAL AID TAX ON ASSETS
Feldstein (1995) calculation of the financial aid 
tax on assets:
Financial aid tax on assets = 1 – (1 – ((.12 + 
return)*taxrt)) (2x (no. of children) + 2)
Edlin (1993) calculation of the financial aid tax 
on assets:
The return on an asset, during the college years, 
without a financial aid tax is 
Rnotax = (1 + return*(1 – ftaxrt – staxrt))yc. 
The return on an asset with the financial aid 
tax is: 
Rtax = (1 + return*(1 – ftaxrt)*(1 – taxrt*0.83) 
– return*staxrt + return*staxrt*taxrt*0.83 – 
0.12*taxrt*0.83)yc. 
The return on an asset with the financial aid 
tax is reduced for two reasons. First, the after 
tax (both federal and state income tax) income 
generated by the asset, increases the Available 
Income (AI) of the parents, which increases 
their contribution from their income, and 
decreases their financial aid. Second, increases 
in the asset base itself, above the Asset Protec-
tion Allowance, increase Adjusted Available 
Income (AAI), which increases the parents’ 
contribution from assets, and decreases their 
financial aid.
The financial aid tax on assets is therefore
1 – (Rtax/Rnotax).*
This paper assumes a 10 percent nominal re-
turn on assets, and the financial aid tax rate is 
adjusted downward by .83 (again following the 
assumption of Edlin (1993)), for EFC exceeding 
the maximum 1997 Pell award of $2,700, to 
account for the fact that not all financial aid is 
grant aid and some of the aid comes in the form 
of loans, thus as EFC increases some of the lost 
financial aid is grant aid but some of the lost 
aid is loan aid, which must be paid back and 
only carries a partial subsidy. 
ftaxrt = federal marginal tax rate
staxrt = state tax rate
taxrt = financial aid tax 
yc = years that the family has a child or children 
 in college
*In the Edlin (1993) paper, he actually presents 
the tax in terms of a post–college tax on con-
sumption, in which case the tax = (Rnotax/Rtax) 
– 1. In this paper, I use the calculation above 
which presents the tax as a reduction in the 
value of the assets.
